IAN HALL |

It is hard to remember now, but before Narendra Modi came to power in May 2014, many reputable pundits thought it would take time before he would find his feet in foreign policy. They were wrong. Contrary to expectations, Modi plunged straight into international relations, issuing invitations to regional leaders, including Pakistan’s Nawaz Sharif, to attend his inauguration, and then jetting off to all points of the compass to meet and greet foreign leaders, CEOs, and representatives of the diaspora.

“For India, as for American allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific, the posture of “America First” has raised the concern that the Trump administration might sell out India’s interests to further those of the US, especially to China.”

The energy that Modi injected into Indian foreign policy in those first few months was as remarkable as it was unexpected. It was also infectious, as was his enthusiasm, helping to generate a rash of books and articles outlining the “Modi Doctrine” with which the new Prime Minister was supposedly transforming India’s international relations.

Three-and-a-bit years on, things look a bit different. Domestically, Modi’s government has been moderately successful. Modi is still riding high in the polls and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies have won a series of key state elections, consolidating power and building the capacity to implement a major reform agenda. Economic growth has been steady, though not spectacular, inflation has remained under control, but job-creation has lagged, and reform – apart from the Goods and Services Tax (GST) – has been patchy.

Internationally, Modi’s government has not done so well, partly because of circumstances far beyond its control, but partly because it lacks a clear strategy for achieving its objectives beyond showmanship and bravado.

Please click here to read the full “Modi’s foreign policy under pressure” article in the IAP Dialogue by Griffith Asia Institute Member, Professor Ian Hall.