JING ZHANG AND CHRISTOPH NEDOPIL WANG  | Griffith Asia Institute Policy Brief | 20-MINUTE READ |

Contents

• Introduction
• What is COP28 and why is it important?
• Agri-food transformation
• Energy transition
• Climate finance
• Unresolved carbon trading
• Conclusion
• Notes and references

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Introduction

China has placed significant emphasis on COP28, hosting over 100 side events to present the country’s propositions and share its concepts, practices and cutting-edge technologies in the environmentally sustainable and carbon-efficient transition. Considering China’s economic strength, its position as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, its undisputed global leadership in renewable energy and its growing role as a bilateral funder for climate finance, analysing China’s stance at COP28 is essential for understanding potential shifts in its domestic policies, technological trajectories and economic strategies. Moreover, China’s engagement in COP28 would shape the collaborative nature of addressing global challenges, impacting not only its own course but also contributing to a more effective and inclusive approach to climate action worldwide.

What is COP28 and why is it important?

COP, an acronym for the Conference of the Parties, refers to a gathering of member states that are party to an agreement with the host country changing every year. Figure 1 traces the evolutionary trajectory of major COP meetings, highlighting key milestones and agreements that have defined international efforts to address the complex and urgent challenge of climate change.

As the 28th instalment, COP28 in Dubai from 30 Nov to 12 December 2023, holds extraordinary significance in fostering global cooperation for sustainable climate solutions. First, it was taking place at a critical juncture amidst a severe climate crisis characterised by escalating temperatures and unprecedented environmental disasters.[i] The urgency for immediate global action is intensified by the stark reality of just seven years remaining until 2030—an initial deadline for many countries to deliver on their commitments to climate goals, which is critical to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement as well. Moreover, the conference marks the conclusive stage of the first global stocktake (GST), a pivotal mechanism for evaluating progress under the Paris Agreement. Simultaneously, COP28 represents a continuation of the mission initiated by COP27, addressing key initiatives such as the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund. The unique geopolitical and environmental considerations of the host country, the UAE, introduce a distinctive layer to discussions, while beyond these aspects, COP28 also serves as a crucial platform for observing shifts in international dynamics. This includes the evolving Sino-US and China-Russia relations and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, both of which shape the global response to interconnected climate challenges.[ii] 

Figure 1: The evolution of COPs

Even so, COP28 achieved significant progress on issues such as accelerating energy transition, boosting climate finance, operationalising Loss and Damage fund, establishing Global Goal on Adaptation, prioritising methane emission reduction, addressing agri-food, gender and health concerns, and reached the final “UAE Consensus”, strengthening the global consensus on climate action.[iii] Table 1 summarises major declarations and China’s endorsements of them at COP28. As shown in Table 1, China has signed agreements on agriculture, nature, gender and health, but notable absences elsewhere leave it with a mixed stance on critical environmental and climate issues, although this will not affect China’s efforts to actively responding to climate change as China has been the country with the largest installed capacity of renewable energy in the world every year for many years. Given the multitude of aspects, this analysis will specifically concentrate on four key areas: agricultural transformation, energy transformation, climate finance and the carbon market—also the main points of discussion at the event.

Table 1: Major declarations and China’s endorsements at COP28

Declaration Document	Main Ambitions	No. of Signatories	China endorses
Declaration on Agriculture, Food and Climate	Scaling-up adaptation and resilience activities Promoting food security and nutrition Supporting workers in agriculture and food systems Strengthening the integrated management of water Maximising the climate and environmental benefits	159	✔
Declaration on Climate and Health	Building more climate-resilient health systems Strengthening cross-sectoral collaboration to reduce emissions and maximise the health benefits of climate action Increasing finance for climate and health solutions	143	✔
Declaration on Gender-responsive Just Transitions	Strengthening all women’s and girls’ leadership and meaningful participation, decision making, capacities, and livelihoods in climate action	76	✔
Declaration on Climate, Nature and People	Fostering stronger synergies, integration and alignment in the planning and implementation of national climate, biodiversity and land restoration plans and strategies Scaling of finance and investments for climate and nature from all sources Encouraging coherence and interoperability across data sources and data collection, metrics and methodologies, and voluntary reporting frameworks	18	✔
Declaration on Climate Relief, Recovery and Peace	Boosting financial support for climate resilience in highly vulnerable countries and communities, particularly those threatened or affected by fragility or conflict or facing severe humanitarian needs	82	x
Coalition for High Ambition Multilevel Partnerships (CHAMP)	Enhancing cooperation with subnational governments in the planning, financing, implementation, and monitoring of climate strategies, including but not limited to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) and Long-Term Low-Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS)	71	x
Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	Tripling the world’s installed renewable energy generation capacity to at least 11,000 GW by 2030 Doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements from around 2 per cent to over 4 per cent every year until 2030 Putting the principle of energy efficiency as the “first fuel” at the core of policymaking, planning, and major investment decision	130	x
Declaration on Climate Finance	Making Finance Available, Accessible and Affordable	13	x
Declaration on Cooling	Incorporating cooling in an existing strategy or action plan, or develop a Heat Action Plan by 2026 Increasing the area and quality of green and blue spaces in urban areas for cooling by 2030 Pursuing public procurement of low-global warming potential and high efficiency cooling technologies focused on the lowest lifecycle cost in government buildings by 2030	66	x
Declaration on Hydrogen	Working towards mutual recognition of the respective certification schemes Seeking accelerated development of technical solutions to enable mutual recognition	37	x
Global Methane Pledge	Cutting global methane emissions by 30 per cent from 2020 levels by 2030	155	x*
Loss and Damage Fund	Providing financial assistance to nations most vulnerable and impacted by the climate change	$792 Mn	x
Oil and Gas Decarbonisation Charter	Net zero by or before 2050 Near-zero methane by 2030 No routine flaring by 2030	50**	ZhenHua Oil

*China committed to include methane in its next NDC; ** 50 companies, representing 40 per cent of global oil production, with National Oil Companies representing over 60 per cent of signatories.

Agri-food transformation

For the first time in thirty years, agriculture and food systems took centre stage in a COP. The signing of the COP28 Declaration on Food and Agriculture by 159 countries highlighted an integral recognition of the interconnectedness between climate change and food systems and emphasized the urgency of adopting an integrated approach to climate action that transcends conventional disciplinary boundaries. The acknowledgment embedded in the Declaration conveys an understanding of the dual role of agriculture both as a contributor and a potential solution to climate change. This recognition will facilitate efforts to implement practices within the agricultural sector that effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions while concurrently promoting sustainable food production.

Agriculture and food systems accounts for approximately one-third of total greenhouse gas emissions if considering the entire value chain including storage, packaging, transportation, processing, sales, and consumption, as shown in Figure 2[iv] China had the highest greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture between 1996 and 2016, which later was surpassed by India according to the World Resources Institute.[v] Therefore, agri-food system transforming is of great significance to the realisation of China’s “double carbon” goal. China’s endorsement of the declaration reflects its commitment to integrating sustainable food system transformation into their next NDCs, aligning with its broader efforts on pursuing sustainable and transformative measures in agricultural sector. This also means that the central budget may be tilted further towards the agri-food system to provide funds and subsidies for transformation and innovation. The Declaration requires the expansion of innovation and financing specifically targeted at soil health, food waste, biodiversity loss and other initiatives aimed at combating climate change. This directive aligns with a concurrent emphasis in China’s domestic policies on diminishing the use of fertilizers and agricultural chemicals, enhancing agricultural waste management, saving ag-machinery energy and advocating for rural biogas.[vi] In a speech delivered in March 2021, President Xi highlighted the potential of carbon credits within ecological systems, urging the maximisation of the role of carbon sequestration in various environments such as forests, grasslands, wetlands, oceans, soil and permafrost.[vii]  The central government has also issued a number of policy measures and targets, such as ‘The 14th Five-Year Plan for National Agricultural Green Development Plan’ and the ‘Top Ten Technical Models for Emission Reduction and Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture and Rural Areas’ in 2021, as well as the ‘Implementation Plan for Agricultural and Rural Emission Reduction and Carbon Sequestration’ in 2022.[viii] 

Figure 2: Examples of greenhouse gas emission sources and sinks from agricultural activities

However, the transition of agri-food system in China faces significant pressure on domestic food security, which may intensify in the future under the combined effects of increased extreme weather (drought and floods), geopolitical conflicts and post-epidemic economic slowdown. This also applies to the whole of Asia, which is home to more than half the world’s population and is expected to consume more than two-thirds of the world’s meat by 2050. Given that China needs to feed 18 per cent of the world’s population with only 9 per cent of arable land and 6 per cent of fresh water, food security has always been the top priority for the Chinese government and achieving food security through greater production of major agricultural products remains a key focus of the 2023 No. 1 Document. This is because feed crops such as soybeans and corn, along with livestock products like beef and dairy, have increasingly relied on imports with the shift in residents’ dietary structure towards protein. Therefore, ensuring food security must be a prerequisite for the agricultural sector to pursue carbon emission reductions, emphasising self-sufficiency in staples and importing non-staples.

This has seen China has in recent years sought to diversify its import sources for food and the raw materials for food production via a “Food Silk Road”, which is creating new food trade routes connecting China, Europe, Russia, Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, aiming to avoid reliance on a single country or region (Figure 3). At the same time, China is expanding its agricultural operations overseas and become a key player in agricultural investment and related infrastructure including farmland, most notably in South America and in Africa for soybeans, meat, palm oil and so on. This global agricultural diversification strategy not only ensures China’s food security but also allows China an ambitious opportunity to implement significant transformation in the domestic agricultural and food system.

However, it’s important to note that both food imports and overseas agricultural investment are likely to have various environmental impacts on trading partners and investing countries, such as deforestation, water pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Efforts to promote sustainable practices, adherence to environmental standards and collaboration between countries may help mitigate these negative environmental impacts.

Figure 3: China’s emerging Food Silk Road

Source: Tortajada and Zhang, 2021)[x]

Energy transition

The latest COP28 draft, calls for a ‘transitioning away’[xi]–not ‘phase-out’–from fossil fuels. An opinion from Financial Review defined this as “another case of geopolitical and energy realities continuing to challenge the direction and pace of the energy transition and ultimately climate policy”.[xii] 

Historically, global north countries—including US, Canada, Australia, Norway and the UK—have been deeply committed to wean the world off coal, oil and natural gas. While both Norway and EU expressed intent to push for fossil fuel ‘phase out’ following draft text, Australia took a toned-down stance by defending the term ‘unabated coal’ using a football analogy, suggesting a justification for continuing certain activities without immediate emission reductions. The UK advocated for ‘guardrails’ to ensure substantial carbon capture, demonstrating a proactive stance on robust carbon reduction measures. Through a different negotiating strategy, Saudi Arabia advocated for a focus on emissions rather than energy sources, implying a potential continuation of reliance on traditional energy sources while addressing environmental concerns.

Other key players, such as India, Russia and China, played pivotal roles with varying approaches too. India was not actively engaging or taking a vocal stance on this debated topic, but Russia has explicitly come out against a fossil fuel phase-out. China neither supported nor opposed a fossil fuel phase-out but called for a ‘balanced’ text with financial support for developing nations, urging developed countries to take the lead in the climate ‘marathon’. Given its recent experience of widespread blackouts in 2021 affecting approximately 44 per cent of industrial activity,[xiii]committing to a complete phase-out, particularly with a specified deadline like 2050, could be too challenging. China’s current energy policy follows a strategy of ‘xianlihoupo (先立后破)’, whereby the retirement of fossil fuel infrastructure need be contingent upon the establishment of a fully functional low-carbon system. China has agreed to ‘phasing down coal’ during the Glasgow conference in 2021 and given that oil and gas are less important for China than coal, agreeing on the same language on all fossil fuels should not be too hard. However, China has adopted a cautious and reserved approach, highlighting that ‘equity and justice are the foundation of climate action.’ It’s important to observe that neither of these countries officially backed the comprehensive commitment to triple the world’s installed renewable energy generation capacity and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency until 2030. The reluctance stems from the comprehensive nature of the commitment, linking renewable energy expansion to the phase-out of fossil fuels, along with concerns about associated costs,[xiv] even if they have indicated support for the tripling of renewable energy by 2030.[xv]

On the other hand, new research reveals that the five global north countries—US, Canada, Australia, Norway and the UK—are intending to augment their oil and gas production by 2030 and are accountable for 51 per cent of the projected oil and gas expansion until 2050;[xvi] China continues to authorise the construction of new coal-fired power plants with over 50GW of new capacity commencing last year, to stabilise prices and ensure a secure electricity supply;[xvii] India currently has 27GW under construction but has announced to incorporate 80GW of thermal power, coal-based, by 2031-32 due to an ‘unprecedented rate’ of increased power demand in the country;[xviii] Sub-Saharan Africa is poised for a substantial increase in energy demand, following a pattern similar to China and India, and showing a preference for fossil fuels due to their cost-effectiveness and reliability. These instances make it clear that the lasting demand for fossil fuels will continue, posing challenges in reaching an agreement on the requests of vulnerable countries.

As shown in Figure 4, China dominates both renewables and coal, but renewables are yet to meet the growth of electricity demand, so navigating the energy transition requires skillful execution of a tight balancing act.

Figure 4: Global electricity generation (TWh, bubble size) and share of electricity (per cent, x-axis).

Climate finance

Climate finance took a pivotal turn at the COP15 in Copenhagen (2009), where developed countries, acknowledging the urgency of climate action, pledged within the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparent implementation to mobilise $100 billion annually by 2020 to support climate initiatives in developing countries. This commitment was formalised at COP16 in Cancun (2010), reiterated and expiry date extended to 2025 during COP21 in Paris. However, it has historically fallen short of the target[xx] due to various factors including inconsistent rules, ambiguous accountability, the political and economic interests of donor countries, and the limited governance capacity of developing nations,[xxi] although improvement was seen at the 2022 Paris Summit after significant pressure applied.

Future financial requirements for agrifood system transforming, the energy transition, climate adaptation and disaster relief are sure to be substantial and overwhelming. A report by Songwe et al[xxii] has projected that emerging markets and developing countries will require $2.4 trillion annually in investments to limit emissions and address challenges posed by climate change.  Emerging from the same system, climate disasters are pushing vulnerable countries deeper into debt as loans continue to be the main instrument used by the developed countries to provide public climate finance, trapping them in a vicious cycle that perversely drives investment in the fossil fuels that further accelerate the climate crisis.[xxiii] Hence, COP28 confronts not only the task of securing funds but also the intricate challenges of addressing debt issues and reshaping the financial architecture.

Given these challenges, progress in climate finance has been notably limited at COP28, with a consensus achieved on the operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund and the framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation. Additionally, a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) has been agreed upon to be set before 2025, based on US$100 billion per year. Developing countries expressed continued concern over the absence of explicit financial commitments within the targets, while developed nations advocate maintaining this ambiguity and postponing detailed financial discussions to the following year. Instead, there is a notable focus and expectation from developed countries on the wealthy emerging economies such as China and the Gulf states, as well as on multilateral development banks (MDBs), to play a crucial role in promoting investment opportunities and mobilising funds.

In fact, relevant research[xxiv] has proven that large nations such as China, India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia have contributed to more climate-related finance via MDBs than many countries in the global north (Figure 5). While China’s identity as a developing country has made it reluctant to take formal responsibilities for financing global climate action, China’s foreign aid and the Belt and Road Initiative have integrated climate components over the past decade and the promotion of a ‘green soft power’ agenda and a ‘greener BRI’ promise has led to heightened Chinese contributions to climate mitigation and adaptation. For example, China has pledged to make available $3.1bn to other developing countries through the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund to implement the ‘10-100-1000 initiative’,[xxv] although this falls short of pledges due to institutional challenges.[xxvi] The project continues without a set implementation deadline. Lippolis’s analysis of Chinese bilateral finance data compiled by research institute AidData[xxvii] shows that the vast majority of China’s climate finance consists of mitigation[xxviii] projects granted on commercial terms, most of which in the hydropower sector and the Americas, specifically Latin America and the Caribbean. In contrast, Africa has received the most non-hydro mitigation finance, with a significant portion directed towards Kenya and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, Asia has been the leading recipient of adaptation finance, particularly in Indonesia and Cambodia. Like other ‘new’ donors, China does not adhere to DAC conventions in categorising its foreign aid and BRI projects based on the Rio climate markers, making it challenging to track its contribution. Domestically, China’s approach to climate investment involves a combination of policies and instruments including green credit, green bonds, green insurance, green funds, and so on.[xxix] What’s more, China unequivocally rejects the notion of categorising or endorsing these contributions as climate finance in alignment with the UNFCCC goals.[xxx] This is in line with China’s steadfast position and persistent assertion that the responsibility for providing climate finance lies squarely with developed countries. I believe developing countries, including most G20 members, are only inclined to make voluntary commitments that they see as contributing to emissions reduction—but don’t call them climate finance.

Figure 5: Top 25 largest climate-related finance providers via MDBs and multilateral climate funds, 2020

In the High-level Forum on South-South Cooperation on Climate Change at COP28, China is committed to further strengthening the South-South cooperation by:

• implementing agreements with the World Meteorological Organisation, supporting the UN’s Early Warnings for All initiative;
• implementing the China-Africa Declaration on Cooperation in Addressing Climate Change, and implementing the Africa Light Belt project to achieve Africa’s sustainable development while promoting energy transformation; and
• sustain ongoing capacity-building training to support climate change professionals in developing countries.

Figure 6: China’s low carbon price with the world’s largest carbon market

Unresolved carbon trading

While COP28 produced positive outcomes, the cooperative mechanism for carbon trading remains unresolved. Countries have failed to agree on key rules including integrity and transparency measures to trade carbon offsets bilaterally and failed also to kickstart a long-anticipated global UN-sanctioned trading market. There was also no agreement on non-market approaches for international collaboration that do not involve the exchange of carbon credits. The US and the EU have consistently been in a dispute over the cooperative mechanism, where the US advocates for a less regulated approach which is in line with the preference of private sector operators, while the EU are pushing for stricter controls to ensure that traded credits effectively reduce emissions without causing additional environmental or social concerns. Therefore, finding common ground on the regulatory framework for this mechanism is pending with discussions deferred to the COP29 in Azerbaijan. This could disrupt the efforts of global rule-makers, impeding their ability to effectively navigate and meet commitments regarding carbon credit transactions. It is particularly relevant for countries, including Singapore, engaged in preliminary deals to purchase carbon credits for meeting emission targets.[xxxii]³²

The breakdown in negotiations will inevitably lead to increased uncertainty in the development of the voluntary carbon market. Without an agreed cooperative mechanism, countries will prioritise own interests, independently constructing or developing domestic carbon markets. The US’ Inflation Reduction Act and the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism are typical cases. The interconnection of relatively well-established national markets will then give rise to regional markets. This scenario presents challenges for China as it works to enhance its domestic carbon market and participate effectively in the international carbon market. This is because regional carbon markets, not completely multilateral, form climate alliances or clubs among two or more countries. Carbon credits trade within these alliances and clubs, usually involving countries with similar climate goals and market rules. Developed countries, particularly in Europe and North America, are most likely to dominate regional carbon trading due to advanced mechanisms. For example, the G7 has included the establishment of a ‘climate club’ in the scope of discussions, and the US and EU have tried to reach an agreement on the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium. In contrast, developing countries face significant barriers in regional carbon trading due to limited domestic markets and disparities in scale, mechanisms and rules. For example, China’s carbon market has potential, but low demand and transaction volume might hinder its entry into the developed countries’ dominated environment (Figure 6). As one of the few developing countries with a carbon market, China will enhance its domestic market as soon as possible according to national conditions. In response to regional alliances and clubs, China might consider initiating carbon market connections with “Belt and Road” countries initially, followed by expansion to multilateral platforms like the G20, BRICS, and APEC. This strategic approach could allow China to actively engage in and influence the formulation of international rules, thereby reinforcing its participation in the global carbon market.

Conclusion

China’s stance at COP28 demonstrates resilience against external pressures, particularly evident in its approach towards formal declarations and substantive commitments. This resilience suggests that: on one hand,  China will determine its own path without being influenced by other countries. Despite facing challenges in addressing the agri-food transition while ensuring food security in the long term, China has exhibited a growing interest in shaping global governance in food security. We believe China will continue strengthening agricultural investment, deepening technological cooperation and expanding climate finance bilaterally with developing and vulnerable countries globally. On the other hand, China’s climate policy is likely to continue evolving in response to competitive pressures and emerging opportunities. China will continue to deepen reforms in the energy system with an unwavering commitment to emission reduction; additionally, the country emphasises the importance of forging robust strategic relationships to maximize cooperation in the evolving landscape of carbon markets. Finally, China intends to unveil its 2030 and 2035 national climate targets (including methane) within the framework of the Paris Agreement by 2025. The recent stabilisation of the US-China relationship provides necessary conditions, but there is a belief that any potential political messages arising between now and then will create a significant impact on China’s climate policies and will shape China’s decisions in 2024/5 over a series of issues including its 2035 NDCs and its direction regarding coal consumption. Despite this, China’s stance will remain instrumental in influencing global climate actions.

About the authors

Jing Zhang is a Research Fellow currently working jointly at the Griffith Asia Institute and the University of Queensland. She is an agricultural economist with a diverse range of expertise encompassing farming systems, natural resource management, agricultural policy and the international trade. She has developed advanced skills in statistical, market and policy analysis, coupled with extensive experience and valuable connections within the Chinese agricultural sector. In her current role at Griffith Asia Institute, she is focused on acquiring expertise in green finance under the supervision of Christoph.

Christoph Nedopil Wang is the Director of the Griffith Asia Institute and a Professor of Economics. He is also a Visiting Faculty at Singapore Management University (SMU) and Fathia International School of Finance (FISF), Fudan University. Christoph engages in research related to green and sustainable finance, as well as development economics. He regularly provides advisory to governments, financial institutions, enterprises, and civil society to advance the application of sustainable finance and development practices. Christoph also serves on several boards with a focus on scaling sustainability in businesses and finance. He has published numerous peer-reviewed articles in various high-ranked journals including Science and has published four books with translations in multiple languages.

Christoph holds a Master of Engineering and a PhD in Economics from the Technical University Berlin, as well as a Master of Public Administration from Harvard Kennedy School. Christoph is a regular contributor to policy, finance and business debates on sustainable finance and development in Asia. He is quoted regularly in Financial Times, The Economist, Bloomberg, Reuters, Science, and other major outlets.

Notes and references

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[i] Henriques, M, 2023, ‘Climate crisis: the 1.5C threshold explained’, BBC, 1 December 2023, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20231130-climate-crisis-the-15c-global-warming-threshold-explained,  Accessed 15 December 2023.

[ii] Bano, S, 2023, ‘COP28: A better climate for US-China relations?’, The Interpreter, 1 December 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/cop28-better-climate-us-china-relations;  Kurushina, D, 2023, ‘How China-Russia relations are impacting COP28’, The Diplomat, 5 December 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/how-china-russia-relations-are-impacting-cop28/.

[iii] UNFCCC 2023, UAE consensus, at https://unfccc.int/cop28/outcomes; UNFCCC 2023, Why the global stocktake is important for climate action this decade, at https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake/about-the-global-stocktake/why-the-global-stocktake-is-important-for-climate-action-this-decade Accessed 15 December 2023.

[iv] Xu, X, Sharma, P, Shu, S, Lin, TS, Ciais, P, Tubiello, FN, Smith, P, Campbell, N and Jain, AK, 2021, ‘Global greenhouse gas emissions from animal-based foods are twice those of plant-based foods’, Nature Food, vol. 2, no. 9, pp. 724-32, https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-021-00358-x.

[v] Arcipowska, A, Mangan, E, Lyu, Y and Waite, R, 2019, 5 questions about agricultural emissions, answered, World Resources Institute, 29 July 2019, at https://www.wri.org/insights/5-questions-about-agricultural-emissions-answered.

[vi] National Development and Reform Commission [国家发展改革委员会], 大力推动农业农村领域节能降碳实现农业绿色发展 [Vigorously promote energy conservation and carbon reduction in agriculture and rural areas to achieve green development of agriculture], 7 July 2023, at https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/ztzl/2023qhjnxcz/bfjncx/202307/t20230707_1358207.html.

[vii] Xinhua News, 2021, 习近平主持召开中央财经委员会第九次会议强调 推动平台经济规范健康持续发展 把碳达峰碳中和纳入生态文明建设整体布局 [Xi Jinping presided over the ninth meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Commission and emphasised promoting the standardised, healthy and sustainable development of the platform economy and incorporating carbon peak and carbon neutrality into the overall layout of ecological civilization construction], 15 March 2021, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021-03/15/c_1127214324.htm.

[viii] Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affair [农业农村部], 2021, 农业农村减排固碳十大技术模式 [Top ten technical models for emission reduction and carbon sequestration in agriculture and rural areas], at http://www.reea.agri.cn/stkzszy/202111/t20211122_7782554.htm, Accessed 3 January 2024; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs [农业农村部], 2021, 十四五全国农业绿色发展规划 [The 14th five-year plan for national agricultural green development], 9 September 2021, at https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-09/09/content_5636345.htm, Accessed 3 January 2024; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs [农业农村部], 2022, 农业农村减排固碳实施方案 [Implementation plan for agricultural and rural emission reduction and carbon sequestration], at https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-07/01/content_5698717.htm,  Accessed 3 January 2024.

[ix] CRS, 2022, Greenhouse gas emissions and sinks in US agriculture, Congressional Research Service, at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11404/11.

[x] Tortajada, C and Zhang, H, 2021, ‘When food meets BRI: China’s emerging Food Silk Road’, Global Food Security, vol. 29, no. 100518, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2021.100518.

[xi] Transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science.

[xii] Gibbons, P, 2023, ‘COP28 shows weaning the world off fossil fuels is hard to do’, Financial Times, https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-climate/cop28-shows-weaning-the-world-off-fossil-fuels-is-hard-to-do-20231203-p5eolh

[xiii] Hoskins, P, 2021, ‘China power cuts: What is causing the country’s blackouts?’, BBC News, 30 September 2021, at https://www.bbc.com/news/business-58733193.

[xiv] Lo, J, 2023, ‘Why didn’t China and India sign Cop28 tripling renewables pledge?’, Climate Home News, 11 Dec 2023. At https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/12/11/why-didnt-china-and-india-sign-cop28-tripling-renewables-pledge/.

[xv] US-China joint sunnylands statement on enhancing cooperation to address the climate crisis backed tripling renewables to substitute coal, oil and gas power and bring about “post-peaking meaningful absolute power sector emission reduction”.

[xvi] Moss, J and Pye, S, 2023, ‘Why fossil fuel exporters must accept their emissions liability’, Climate Justice, https://climatejustice.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/JeremyMoss-Export-Emissions-Report-d4.pdf; PTI, 2023, ‘Climate experts from Global South condemn developed countries’ ‘hypocrisy’ on fossil fuel expansion’, Deccan Herald, 20 September 2023, at https://www.deccanherald.com/world/climate-experts-from-global-south-condemn-developed-countries-hypocrisy-on-fossil-fuel-expansion-2693586.

[xvii] Xia, Z, 2023, ‘China also started work on 50 gigawatts of coal power last year, a jump of more than 50 per cent on 2021’, China Dialogue, 11 April 2023, at https://chinadialogue.net/en/energy/changing-coal-use-in-eu-and-china-since-the-energy-crisis/.

[xviii] Prasad, S, 2023, ‘India, Indonesia, Bangladesh & Vietnam host to most under-construction coal projects worldwide: report’, DownToEarth, 28 November 2023, at https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/energy/india-indonesia-bangladesh-vietnam-host-to-most-under-construction-coal-projects-worldwide-report-93039.

[xix] Ember, 2023, Global electricity review 2023, Ember, https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/global-electricity-review-2023/.   

[xx] OECD, 2023, Climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries in 2013-2021: aggregate trends and opportunities for scaling up adaptation and mobilised private finance, climate finance and the USD 100 billion goal, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/e20d2bc7-en.

[xxi] Qi, J & Qian, H, 2023, ‘Climate finance at a crossroads: it is high time to use the global solution for global problems’, Carbon Neutrality, vol. 2, no. 31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43979-023-00071-7.

[xxii] Songwe, V, Stern, N & Bhattacharya, A, 2022, Finance for climate action: scaling up investment for climate and development, Report, London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, pp. 1-97, at https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/IHLEG-Finance-for-Climate-Action-1.pdf.

[xxiii] Woolfendden, T, 2023, ‘Rising debt locks global south countries in fossil fuel production’, Debt Justice, 21 August 2023, at https://debtjustice.org.uk/press-release/rising-debt-locks-global-south-countries-in-fossil-fuel-production.

[xxiv] Lippolis, N, 2022, China’s overseas climate finance, 2000-2017, SSRN 4502356, at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4502356; Cao, Y and Tsang, B, 2023, ‘Why some ‘developing’ countries are already among largest climate-finance contributors’, Carbon Brief, 11 December 2023, at https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-some-developing-countries-are-already-among-largest-climate-finance-contributors/ 

[xxv] China’s ‘10-100-1000’ initiative refers to implement ten low-carbon development demonstration projects, one hundred climate mitigation and adaptation projects, and climate training programmes for one thousand representatives from developing countries.

[xxvi] Tsang, B, Schäpe, B and Hackbarth, A, 2023, Follow the money Chinese climate related finance to the global south, Briefing paper, E3G, pp.1-13, at https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/E3G-Briefing-Follow-the-Money-Chinese-climate-related-finance-to-the-Global-South.pdf. 

[xxvii] AidData, 2021, AidData’s global Chinese development finance dataset, version 2.0, https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinese-development-finance-dataset-version-2-0.

[xxviii] Adaptation finance faces more challenges compared to mitigation investments, primarily due to uncertainties surrounding the economic consequences of climate impacts and the efficacy of adaptation technologies. This is exacerbated by the lack of appeal to the private sector, stemming from the under-pricing of risks in emerging markets and developing economies entities commonly face challenges such as inadequate financing channels and a lack of economies of scale.

[xxix] Nedopil, C and Song, ZY, 2023, China Green Finance Status and Trends 2022-23, Report, Green Finance & Development Centre, FISF Fudan University, Shanghai, https://greenfdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Nedopil-Song-2023_China-Green-Finance-Trends-and-Opportunities.pdf. 

[xxx] Civillini, M, 2023, ‘China’s Belt and Road gets ‘green’ reboot and spending boost’, Climate Home News, 19 October 2023, at https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/10/19/chinas-clean-energy-program-belt-and-road/, Accessed 20 December 2023.

[xxxi] Cao, Y and Tsang, B, 2023, ‘Why some ‘developing’ countries are already among largest climate-finance contributors’, Carbon Brief, 11 December 2023, at https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-some-developing-countries-are-already-among-largest-climate-finance-contributors/

[xxxii]   Lianhe Zaobao, 2023, 与多国展开碳信用交易合作 有助于新加坡实现净零排放目标 [Carbon credit trading cooperation with many countries will help Singapore achieve its net-zero emissions goal], 5 December 2022, at http://sg.mofcom.gov.cn/article/dtxx/202212/20221203371927.shtml.

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