The most-talked about development, this fortnight, is the significant diplomatic coup pulled off by Kim Jong Un in getting Donald Trump to agree to his spontaneous invitation for a face-to-face summit meeting, the first of its kind, between a North Korean leader and a US president. The invitation was extended through the mediation of South Korean diplomats, who have been negotiating with Pyongyang for some time now. To prepare the groundwork for the talks, US, South Korean and Japanese diplomats have been in close discussion over the last few weeks. However, it needs to be clarified that North Korea has not yet confirmed the summit with the US and Kim is still said to be ‘taking stock’ of the situation.
According to the US and South Korea, Kim has agreed to talk on denuclearisation, promised that no further testing would take place in the lead up to or during the summit and declared that he would not object to the proposed military exercises between the US and South Korea scheduled next month. Some are calling this Trump’s ‘Nixon moment’. However, critics argue that if anything, this is a major victory for Pyongyang. A summit meeting with the president of the United States would serve to legitimise Kim’s pariah regime and enhance his domestic stature and confidence as a leader. Cynics remain circumspect of any real successes coming out of the negotiations because of past experiences of dealing with North Korea. In any event, with a weak, understaffed and depleted State Department, Trump has little chance of extracting any concessions.
The replacement of Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, by the C.I.A. Director, Mike Pompeo, days after the announcement of the summit, was a crucial development. Interestingly, Tillerson was the only member of the administration who was willing to talk to the North Koreans, putting him at odds with Trump’s more confrontational approach. The incoming Secretary of State, on the other hand, has a much more hawkish reputation not only with regard to his stance on North Korea but on other issues as well. The US approach to the forthcoming negotiations is thus quite clear; whether they are able to achieve any breakthroughs remains to be seen. The South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, in the meanwhile, has proposed a three-way summit between Washington, Pyongyang and Seoul, if their respective bilateral summit meetings go well.
The confirmation of constitutional amendments removing presidential term limits by the recently concluded National People’s Congress in China is likely to have major global ramifications, most importantly, marking the advent of a more iron-fisted Chinese foreign policy. The move was followed by a shake-up of the Chinese bureaucracy with the merging and streamlining of several ministries in a drive to increase efficiency. If President Xi’s nationalistic speech to close the parliamentary session, in which he vowed to ‘to fight the bloody battle against our enemies’ to ‘regain our place in the world’ is anything to go by, one can expect an even more assertive and perhaps even belligerent foreign policy from China in the future. In a pointed reference to Taiwan, Xi declared that ‘we should achieve full unification of our motherland’ and ‘any actions or tricks to split China are doomed for failure’. The tone and tenor of his speech mark a departure from the norm for such speeches and are indicative of the return of an era of strongman politics in China.
Australia hosted its first ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in Sydney from 16th to 18th March, which, apart from the Leaders’ Summit and Retreat, also comprised two major side-events: a business summit and a counter-terrorism conference. Although billed as ‘an historic opportunity to strengthen Australia’s strategic partnership with ASEAN’, critics point out that it didn’t achieve much in terms of tangible benefits. One of the most-talked about developments was Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s invocation to Australia to join ASEAN, which some commentators argue was not meant to be taken seriously. In any case, critics opine that such a prospect goes against the very grain of Australia’s foreign policy, not least because it would mean losing its identity in international negotiations with external parties and turning a blind eye to human and democratic rights violations in the region (to comply with ASEAN norms of non-interference). Nonetheless, some saw the summit as a ‘diplomatic coup’ which apart from showcasing Australia’s commitment to bettering relations with Southeast Asia, is also indicative of Southeast Asia’s appreciation for pragmatic Australian diplomacy.
Fulfilling his election promise to pursue protectionism abroad, President Trump announced new steel and aluminium tariffs purportedly to stop China from producing and dumping excess steel in US markets. Commentators argue that since the proposed tariffs are sanctioned under a provision of US trade law that deals with national security, NATO and other allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia could seek exemption, to prevent a ‘broader trade war’. This development was followed by news that Trump was planning a more onerous tariff as a punitive measure against China for IP theft. Some, however, note the dangers of the unilateral nature of such measures and their circumvention of international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation. In the larger scheme of things, critics reason, this could signal a retreat of US leadership from the rules-based order and encourage other nations to follow suit with retaliatory measures of their own (which appear to have been set in motion already).
On another front, Emmanuel Macron’s four-day visit to India to co-host the International Solar Alliance Summit was significant for many reasons but most importantly for the signing of a crucial reciprocal defence logistics support agreement, which is ‘symbolic of the strategic depth and maturity reached in India-France defence ties’. It reflects India’s growing recognition of France as a stakeholder in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and would allow for the two countries to expand naval cooperation in the IOR with an eye on China. The two countries signed a total of 14 agreements including on clean energy, space technology, railways, among others. Interestingly, President Macron proclaimed that he wished France to be ‘India’s best partner’ and entry point in Europe, a wish, which as some point out, had earlier been expressed by pre-Brexit Britain.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe found himself at the centre of a corruption scandal after his wife and senior ministers were implicated in a ‘sweetheart’ land deal. This has led to a furore in the country and protesters are calling for the Finance Minister, Taro Aso’s resignation. More importantly, the revelations could be catastrophic for Abe’s political career as calls for his resignation are beginning to surface. This could have significant regional implications too; Abe is credited to be one of the chief architects and supporters of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly referred to as the Quad. With Quad 2.0 still in its infancy and on unsure grounds, the suggestion of Abe’s departure from the scene could spell a death-knell to the grouping once more.
In a bizarre turn of events, Indian and Pakistani diplomats indulged in a round of ‘door-bell diplomacy’ where the door-bell of the Pakistani Deputy High Commission’s residence in New Delhi was rung at 3am as a tit-for-tat to avenge for a similar harassment of the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Islamabad a few days previously (which the latter believed was the work of the Pakistani intelligence). This incident comes in the wake of a series of such ‘low-level diplomatic hostilities’ between the foreign missions of the two countries. While relations between the subcontinent rivals continue to deteriorate, such irritants do little to restore trust or harmony.
Significance for Australia
This fortnight was marked by quite a few important developments, with prospects of long-term implications for Australia. Although the US decision to accept Kim Jong Un’s summit invitation seems like a positive step on paper, the chances of failure and further deterioration in relations are high. However, China’s recent cooperation in maintaining sanctions on Pyongyang offers at least some hope in the long term.
The ASEAN-Australia Special Summit was significant in terms of beginning a new chapter in Australia-ASEAN relations. Australia is putting its money where its mouth is: the summit was reflective of Australia’s efforts to build better relations with Southeast Asian countries as outlined in the latest Foreign Policy White Paper. The event has opened the doors for more sustained engagement and advancement in trade and security cooperation between Australia and ASEAN members, all the more important in the context of a more assertive and muscular Chinese foreign policy post Xi Jinping’s effective assumption of a dictatorship. On another note, even though Australia finds itself exempted from President Trump’s punitive steel and aluminium tariffs, the broader implications of the measures, on global trade and the rules-based order, are of grave concern to Australia. If China and other countries retaliate with similar tactics, the overall results would be detrimental to Australian interests of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
