HUIYUN FENG AND KAI HE |
The ongoing war in Ukraine has cast a spotlight on China–Russia relations, with both nations affirming their stance against forming a military alliance. This situation raises intriguing questions: why won’t China and Russia form an alliance? And under what conditions might they consider doing so in peacetime?
In our recent study, we introduce a “balance-of-beliefs” framework that offers a fresh perspective on why these two powers, despite their increasing cooperation, have shunned a formal alliance. Drawing on operational code analysis, we examined the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of leaders from the United States (Barack Obama), Australia (Tony Abbott), China (Xi Jinping), and Russia (Vladimir Putin) between 2013 and 2015. We also extended the analysis to compare Putin and Xi between 2016 and 2022.
The balance-of-beliefs framework
The foundation of this argument lies in the alignment of leaders’ beliefs about the political universe (leader’s P-1 belief) and their strategic approach to achieving political goals (the I-1 belief), two master beliefs in the cognitive operational belief systems. For alliances to form in peacetime, it’s not just about having shared interests—leaders need to have congruent worldviews. This is evident in the strong alignment of the US–Australia alliance, where Obama and Abbott shared similar P-1 and I-1 beliefs. In contrast, the divergent P-1 beliefs of Xi and Putin have prevented a Sino-Russian military alliance, despite their cooperation on specific issues driven by shared I-1 beliefs.
Xi and Putin’s relationship: Cooperation without an alliance
Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Putin visited Beijing, where he and Xi reaffirmed that their friendship had “no limits.” They sealed several significant energy deals, such as Gazprom’s agreement to supply China with natural gas for 25 years, and Rosneft’s contract to deliver 100 million tonnes of crude oil over a decade. These deals have been vital for Russia, helping it counter Western sanctions. Between 2013 and 2023, Xi and Putin met 42 times, a clear testament to their deepening relationship. Yet, despite these closer ties, both nations have repeatedly stated they have no intention of forming a military alliance.
China, through voices like former vice minister of foreign affairs Fu Ying, has long made clear that it has no interest in a formal alliance with Russia. Similarly, in 2023, then Russian defence minister Sergey Shoigu clarified that their defence ties are not aimed at third countries. This is where the “balance-of-beliefs” framework comes into play. The conventional “balance-of-threat” theory suggests that with mounting US pressure, China and Russia should naturally form an alliance. China-Russian partnership, after the Post-Cold War has evolved through different phases of deepening short of military alliance. We argue through our balance of beliefs framework that this is because during peacetime, shared beliefs between leaders play a much bigger role than simply facing a common threat.
Divergent worldviews: The obstacle to a military alliance
The key hindrance to a formal alliance is rooted in the different belief systems of Xi and Putin. While they share similar strategic views (I-1 beliefs) on how to achieve their goals, their worldviews (P-1 beliefs) differ significantly. Xi’s belief in a harmonious global order contrasts with Putin’s more adversarial outlook on international politics. This divergence complicates any attempt to form a deep, strategic military alliance, even though they find common ground in opposing US influence.
It’s crucial to acknowledge that while the US has acted as a common antagonist for both Russia and China, their cooperation remains pragmatic. They have coordinated efforts to counter US initiatives in forums like the UN, but the relationship is not without friction. Energy deals, infrastructure projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and military trade have all been areas of collaboration. However, the underlying tensions—such as Russia’s energy deal with Vietnam, which antagonises China, and China’s growing influence in Central Asia—reflect the limits of their partnership.
Implications for policymakers
So, why does this matter? For policymakers, particularly those in the US and Europe, understanding the dynamics between Xi and Putin is crucial for crafting effective strategies. The US needs to recognise the differences in worldview between these two leaders and avoid pushing them into a tighter alliance, which would only exacerbate tensions. At the same time, it’s essential to acknowledge that if the global landscape continues to shift—such as with the ongoing war in Ukraine—these divergent beliefs might evolve. A future China–Russia alliance is not out of the question, especially if the US continues to intensify its stance against both nations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our balance-of-beliefs framework highlights the importance of shared worldviews in forming alliances during peacetime. While China and Russia have deepened their cooperation, their differing philosophical beliefs stand in the way of a formal military alliance. Yet, as the world changes, so too might their relationship, with significant implications for global geopolitics. The US must be strategic in navigating its relationships with both a rising China and a resurgent Russia, understanding that forcing these two powers together could lead to unintended consequences.
Professor Huiyun Feng is professor of international relations at the School of Government and International Relations and a member of the Griffith Asia Institute. Professor Kai He is professor of International Relations at the School of Government and International Relations. .
This article is a synopsis of the journal article “Why will China and Russia not form an alliance? The balance of beliefs in peacetime” published in the journal International Affairs, written by Huiyun Feng and Kai He.
