North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs continue to trigger strategic anxiety in Asia. Since embarking on a nuclear program in the 1950s, Pyongyang has acquired weapons of mass destruction that can hit targets well beyond the Korean peninsula. The strike radius of the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) forces has steadily expanded since the 1990s, with analysts focusing on the country’s emerging capacity to strike targets on the continental United States. Pyongyang has successfully demonstrated a space launch vehicle capability, which is a critical pre-requisite to acquiring an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

…it seems credible to assume that North Korea will be able to field a nuclear-armed ICBM force within three to five years.

Given the impressive trajectory of North Korea’s long-range missile program thus far, coupled with the regime’s declared aspiration to strike the US and its allies, it’s almost certainly only a matter of time before the DPRK acquires an operational ICBM. It is no mean feat to miniaturise a nuclear warhead, but in light of North Korea’s proven track record in the nuclear domain, coupled with its hardcore determination, it must be getting close to achieving this breakthrough capability. Indeed, the declared consensus among South Korean and US officials is that Pyongyang has already attained this threshold. These concerns have been magnified recently with reports that the North is actively working on a thermonuclear capability as part of its testing program which, if successful, would dramatically multiply the explosive yield of its nuclear forces.

The DPRK has not been afraid to risk public failure in its missile testing program, but observers are wrong to assume this confirms that Pyongyang is incapable of achieving its holy grail of an ICBM that can strike the continental US. Throughout history, all long-range missile programs have been characterised by testing failures. But for determined countries, over time, a j-curve effect emerges where initial failures are replaced by more consistent successes. In terms of prestige, resources, and sheer political will, successive North Korean regimes have invested much in the country’s missile testing programs, and the j-curve effect is already apparent. Estimates vary, but it seems credible to assume that North Korea will be able to field a nuclear-armed ICBM force within three to five years. Short of a regime collapse in Pyongyang or war on the Korean peninsula, there appears to be nothing that will prevent this from materialising.

Please click here to read the full “The Strategic Challenges of a Nuclear North Korea” article in the IAPS Dialogue by Griffith Asia Institute member Professor Andrew O’Neil.