On 16 January, the Republic of China (ROC), i.e. Taiwan, held its sixth election for the president and the legislature. The outcome had been predicted to be one-sided for the past six months, but the result turned out to be a rout and marks Taiwan’s third transition of power. The incumbent Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, Eric Chu, received only 31% of the popular vote against Tsai Ing-wen, his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) opponent’s 56%, and the DPP won an absolute majority in the legislature meaning that the KMT cannot block its legislation as it did during the tenure of the previous DPP president. The remaining votes went to a third party candidate.

Many press reports have focussed on the China factor in this election, and it was, indeed important. Taiwanese see the PRC as a threat and a bully. It has hundreds of missiles aimed at Taiwan. In Hong Kong it has eroded the promised fifty years of one country two systems government, including attacks on media freedom and judicial independence, attempts to bring in ‘patriotic’ textbooks in schools, and the recent disappearance of five book sellers in Hong Kong. A video that emerged the day before the election of a 16 year-old Taiwanese singer forced to make an abject apology to the people of China for innocently waving an ROC flag in her dormitory room brought forth condemnation from all the presidential candidates and motivated many to vote.

However, for the Taiwanese voters, domestic issues were more important. The economy has been stagnant for the past 15 years. The KMT incumbent, Ma Ying-jeou, came to office in 2008 promising ‘6-3-3,’ 6% annual growth, under 3% unemployment, and annual per capita incomes of US$30,000. To accomplish that he focussed on establishing trade and exchange links with the PRC. He signed 20 such pacts, but the main beneficiaries have been wealthy Taiwanese investors in the PRC rather than ordinary Taiwanese workers. Moreover, anticipation of PRC investments has driven up property prices such that basic housing on the fringe of Taipei costs as much as 40 times the average annual wage. Ma’s 6-3-3 figures for 2015 were 1%, 4% and US$24,000. Politically Ma was increasingly seen as an indecisive bumbler who undermined Taiwan’s democratic institutions, neglected domestic issues, took Taiwan too close to the PRC, and ran an administration that was tainted with corruption. His popularity during much of his last term ranged from 9% to 17%.

A third factor in the election result is a change in the identity of people in Taiwan. Under KMT rule, which began in 1945, Taiwan’s education system was very heavily skewed toward a Chinese identity, and the home languages of Taiwanese were suppressed in favour of Mandarin. Moreover, the government’s ‘sacred’ goal was to recover mainland China from the communists. However, a latent Taiwanese identity remained among the native population which gradually grew along with opposition to the KMT and Mainlander dominance. First and second generation Mainlanders maintained a strong identification with China, but the third and fourth generations have developed a strong Taiwanese identification. At present over 60% of the population regards themselves as Taiwanese; only 3.5% regard themselves as Chinese, the rest identifying as both. The young in particular object to being referred to as Chinese or to referring to the PRC as the ‘mainland’ (implying that Taiwan is a part of the PRC).

Some reports claim that incoming President Tsai, whose party advocates formal independence from the PRC, will have difficulty dealing with Beijing. Tsai, however, has downplayed this plank; she has also promised no surprises and to maintain the status quo in the cross-Straits relationship. She is a known quantity to PRC negotiators. As head of the Mainland Affairs Council between 2000-2008, she negotiated the ‘three small links,’ which established limited postal, trade and transport links between Taiwan’s offshore islands and specified cities in Fujian province, and the first direct charter flights. She also convinced the Taiwan government to lift restrictions on Taiwanese investments in the PRC. All these were pragmatic steps, welcomed in Beijing as well as at home. Beijing reacted to the election result with an ‘obligatory’ warning against any moves toward independence but has not made demands on Tsai that she cannot keep. For the meantime, at least, it appears that it will not attempt to complicate the relationship.

Article by David Schak, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute.