The last fortnight was witness to two important summits between rival nations in the region, both significant for the apparent ‘thaw’ in bilateral relations that they symbolised. Yet, there is a great deal of circumspection on the prospects of any real rapprochement taking place, either between North and South Korea or between India and China. A third, less publicised but nevertheless important summit, that of the ASEAN leaders, was held as well.
The Korean summit held at Panmunjom after months of diplomatic to-and-fro, was hailed as historic. The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, issued at the end of the summit, lay the pathway for further progress in relations conditioned upon the denuclearisation of the peninsula and may even bring the Korean War to an official end. Sceptics, however, aren’t too optimistic about Kim Jong-un’s pledge on denuclearisation, arguing that Pyongyang had made such empty promises in the past and subsequently reneged. This summit was seen as preparation ahead of US President Donald Trump’s much-publicised meeting with the DPRK leader in the very near future. Interestingly, Trump is taking credit for the improvement in relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, and Moon Jae-in even remarked that the US President deserved a nobel peace prize for his role in bringing DPRK to the negotiating table.
In a surprise move that disappointed many, Trump nominated Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr. to become the next ambassador to South Korea, instead of sending him as his envoy to Canberra (which was to be the case earlier). The office of the US ambassador to Australia has been vacant for over a year, which many consider a slight, given the close relations between the two countries. Although Foreign Minister Julie Bishop downplayed the significance of the decision, critics remarked that it sent a ‘terrible message’ to Australia and demonstrated that it wasn’t high on the US priority list. Perhaps to assuage Australian concerns, the US then asked Canberra for its own suggestions for a preferred candidate to fill the role.
After months of Indian overtures to China, Beijing issued an invitation to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for an ‘informal summit’ at Wuhan, to ‘reset’ relations between the two countries after the hostilities at Doklam last year. Even so, there weren’t any real expectations of a breakthrough taking place in terms of tangible results. The individual statements issued by both parties after the summit demonstrated clear differences– a point emphasised by the detractors on the Indian side, who warn that China intends to wean India away from a potential partnership with the US and its allies. Most tellingly, India announced that it had rejected Australia’s offer to participate in the 2018 US-Japan-India Malabar naval exercises, just before the Modi-Xi summit began. Although it is reported that the decision to exclude Australia was taken months ago, the timing of the announcement made it appear as if it was meant to placate Beijing.
The 32nd ASEAN leaders’ summit took place in Singapore last month, where officials drew up two comprehensive policy documents: Zero Draft of Chairman’s Statement and the ASEAN Leaders’ Vision for a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN. Two other documents were also released: Concept Note for an ASEAN Smart Cities Network and the ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on Cyber Security Cooperation. Analysts note that while a range of security matters were discussed at the summit, cyber security was given special emphasis. However, critics point out that owing to ASEAN norms of consensus, South China Sea disputes received a ‘subdued treatment’. Six out of the seven points on the South China Sea, prepared in the original draft of the Chairman’s statement, were deleted in the final version because of interventions by some countries, particularly Cambodia. Critics thus question the ASEAN commitment to ‘an ASEAN-centric regional architecture that is open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based.’
Ironically, the ASEAN Chair sought the support of the member countries to approach the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to lodge a protest against ‘the non-inclusion of an ASEAN reservation’, on the South China Sea, in the Final Document released by the 18th Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting of the NAM held in Azerbaijan early last month.
In other news, French President Emmanuel Macron is on his visit to Australia, days after Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s visit to Villers-Bretonneux on Anzac Day. The French President has invocated his vision to create a ‘new Indo-Pacific Axis’ with Australia as a key partner, dedicated to preserving the security, free trade and rule of law in the region. Macron has expressed his desire for France, being the only European power with territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, to be ‘at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific axis’. Both leaders, while welcoming China’s rise and growth as a global power, called on Beijing to abide by the rule of law to preserve the liberal order. Notably, Turnbull has enthusiastically supported Macron’s vision and has called France a ‘Pacific Ocean power’. Moreover, Macron has warned against trying to resist China’s Belt and Road Initiative, arguing that countries like Australia and France must use this opportunity to ‘define the rules of the game’ and ensure the preservation of sovereignty. Australia and France have entered into a series of agreements to bolster defence and security ties, including measures to tackle cyber threats, and advance cooperation in education, innovation and climate change.
Significance for Australia
This fortnight has left Australia with much to ponder. Both major summits that took place were assessed to be long on optics and short on substance.
Meanwhile, Turnbull and Bishop issued statements of cautious optimism regarding prospects of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Experts argue that Canberra should be prepared to ‘anticipate the full range of possible outcomes’ and must be prepared for ‘worst-case scenarios’.
On the other hand, the US decision to send Admiral Harris to Seoul instead of Canberra, is also likely to add to Australian insecurity vis-à-vis the US commitment to Australia. In an unprecedented situation, the office of the US ambassador has been vacant for over 19 months. Although the US is keen to emphasise that this move is not intended as a slight, it is probable that Canberra might feel neglected. Already, there is a debate about US reliability and Australian options, Down Under. This episode is going to add fuel to voices that advocate a more independent policy course for Australia.
India’s refusal to allow Australia to join the Malabar naval exercise, even as an observer, is likely to disappoint many in Canberra. The move will probably leave a taste of bitterness in bilateral relations between Australia and India, significant because the latter has been touted as being one of Australia’s key partners in Canberra’s perception of the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.
Australia may feel disappointed about the ASEAN leaders’ lack of consensus in taking a firm stance on the South China Sea disputes. The Foreign Policy White Paper envisages ASEAN as one of Australia’s main partners in preserving a rules-based international order. Their reticence in committing more to the regional security architecture may concern Canberra.
President Macron has been warmly welcomed in Australia. France has, in the recent past, established strong credentials of being a stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific, by deepening maritime cooperation with India. The president’s statement indicating France’s aim ‘to bolster the chain of democracies from Paris to Canberra via Delhi’ may be interpreted as a pointed remark on growing Chinese assertiveness in the region and championing the rules-based order that Australia seeks to secure. The visit thus symbolises a new dimension to Australia’s Indo-Pacific diplomatic geometrics, one that is likely to have significant bearings upon how Canberra perceives and defines the region.
