The events of the past fortnight have led Australians to again reflect on the extent of Chinese influence they’re ready to tolerate on their soil and whether their democratic values are under threat. Last week, a student protest at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, against China’s heavy-handedness in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, turned ugly when pro-Beijing students attacked the protestors. The incident was further politicised by Brisbane’s Chinese Consul General Xu Jie who praised the Chinese students opposing the protestors for being ‘patriotic’. The Morrison government issued a strong objection to the Consul-General’s remarks with Foreign Minister Marise Payne emphasising that foreign diplomats must respect Australia’s free speech laws and the rights of citizens to peaceful protest, ‘even on contentious and sensitive issues.’ This episode is indicative of a much deeper problem and raises questions about the extent to which Australian universities are complying with the government’s foreign influence transparency scheme.

Another media investigation this fortnight, this time by 60 Minutes revealed that the Crown casino in Melbourne was involved in money-laundering and that it had an arrangement with Australian immigration officials to expedite visas for high-flying Chinese nationals. Speaking about visas, the Chinese government has issued a ban on individual travel to Taiwan in mainland China in a bid to apply pressure on Taiwan’s economy.

On another note, Chinese-Australian writer Yang Hengjun is set to be formally charged with being a national security threat in China. Marise Payne voiced Australia’s objections to Mr Yang’s incarceration for his political views but was beaten down by China, which asked Australia not to interfere in its domestic matters. As a side note, Hong Kong protests continue to worsen with violent clashes reported between protesters and the police.

China has reportedly signed a secret agreement with Cambodia which would allow the People’s Liberation Army-Navy to use a Cambodian naval base. It would give Beijing exclusive rights to a section of the Cambodian naval installation on the Gulf of Thailand for an initial period of 30 years. The deal ‘would sharply increase Beijing’s capacity to enforce territorial claims and economic interests in the South China Sea, to threaten U.S. allies in Southeast Asia and to extend its influence over the strategically important Malacca Strait.’ China and Cambodia have denied these reports.

On a similar note, Vietnam and China are sparring in the South China Sea again. Earlier this fortnight, Vietnam asked China to remove its oil drillship operating near in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone near the Spratly Islands after China tested several anti-ship ballistic missiles in the region last month. However, faced with a defiant Beijing, the Vietnamese government announced recently that it intends to extend its oil rig operations on Vanguard Bank. The US Department of State issued a statement supporting Hanoi and criticised China for undermining other nations’ rights and sovereignty in the South China Sea.

The Philippines has again issued a diplomatic protest against China for ‘swarming’ waters near the disputed Pag-asa or the Thitu island with over 100 vessels this fortnight. The conflict over the island has been waging for some time now and despite the UN ruling favouring the Philippines, China continues to exert claims over the island.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan visited the US earlier this fortnight.  It was celebrated as a huge diplomatic success by Pakistan, palpably ending a five-year estrangement between the two nations. The main agenda on the table was the Afghan peace process; the US realises that it can’t hope to withdraw peacefully from Afghanistan without Pakistan’s cooperation. US President Donald Trump committed a major diplomatic faux pas during his meeting with Khan when he said that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had requested for US mediation on Kashmir. The Indian government was quick to react and issued a firm denial as India considers Kashmir to be a bilateral issue. Nonetheless, Pakistan walked away with a major perceptive victory. The visit has renewed Islamabad’s hopes of a resumption of US economic and military aid at a time when the country’s economy and diplomatic standing are in doldrums.

North Korea has been steadily testing the US’s patience again. Yesterday, North Korea conducted its second ballistic missile test of the week. North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un was also seen inspecting a new submarine recently. Analysts say that Pyongyang is protesting the proposed annual military exercises between Seoul and Washington and also the lack of progress on the sanctions removal that it seeks from the US.

The 27th round of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement was concluded in China this week with Beijing expressing confidence that the negotiations were on the right track. Negotiations are set to be taken up to a ministerial level this week, but Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal’s absence might prove to be a dampener. The Indian government is under considerable pressure from local interest groups opposed to India signing up to RCEP and it seems more or less likely that India will opt out, despite Australia’s great efforts at trying to make New Delhi see the benefits of free trade for local industry. Australian High Commissioner Harinder Sidhu remarked that Australia will be ‘very disappointed’ if India is excluded from RCEP. Closer to home, the US is planning to invest $300 million for a new ‘Navy Military Construction’ in Darwin. Earlier this fortnight, Australian Defence Minister Linda Reynolds announced that the US Marine Rotational Force in Darwin had reached maximum capacity, with 2,500 US Marines deployed. Further details are unknown but the draft US legislation detailing US plans also included proposals for other defence projects in the Northern Territory.

Significance for Australia

The past fortnight will go down as yet another episode of Australia grappling with the problem of Chinese influence in the country and trying to demarcate the line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of influence. At the moment, it’s all grey. Australia’s strong objection to the Chinese Consul-General’s remarks is a positive development; we need to be firm about maintaining our freedom of speech and disallowing foreign governments to support violent actions on our soil. At the same time, it’s worrying to note the extent to which Australian universities and businesses are susceptible to pressure from Beijing. The investigation into corrupt immigration practices is also an indictment of how far-reaching the problem is.

China’s continuing aggression in the South China Sea is a cause for real worry. Its access to a Cambodian naval base on the Gulf of Thailand will augment its ability to project power in the region and threaten regional stability as is already evident in the case of its tussles with Vietnam and Philippines.

On another note, India’s exclusion from RCEP will be a big blow to Australia’s expectations to see New Delhi further integrated into the regional trading system. Canberra would do well to keep up with its efforts to influence India’s decision. Australia has, nonetheless, expressed confidence to seal the RCEP deal by the year’s end; with or without India? remains to be seen but Australia would strongly hope for the former.

AUTHOR

Aakriti Bachhawat is a Researcher with the Defence and Strategy team at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and Research Assistant at the Griffith Asia Institute.