When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers
Swahili proverb
Introduction
This proverb can be interpreted in several ways. Most obviously, it refers to the likelihood that those who are or are perceived to be weak will be trampled and damaged by competition and conflict between the powerful. Those who are most at risk of collateral damage are not those who have initiated the conflict. It also points to elements of resilience and recovery: provided the root structure holds strong, the grass may recover and regrow once the elephants have moved on.
Describing the Pacific islands region as ‘the grass’ is far from ideal. Having achieved and maintained sovereignty, countries are rightly concerned with asserting agency and strategic independence. However, they are constrained in doing so by several forces that are hard to withstand, particularly when they converge. Among these forces are the following that will be considered here: geopolitical competition and the decline of multilateralism. As 2026 gets underway, the world is at an inflection point that marks this period as different and more challenging. For the countries of the Pacific islands region, the need for agency and strategic autonomy is greater than ever.
This is not a story of doom and gloom. It is a realistic assessment of the strategic situation in which many Pacific island countries find themselves. It is also an opportunity to shine a spotlight on where Pacific leaders and communities are innovating to drive their own story.
Geopolitical competition
Recent actions and statements from the Trump administration indicate that we are indeed in an era of increased multi-polarity. Moreover, callbacks to the Monroe Doctrine and explicit references to the pre-eminence of ‘might’ as a tool of influence, flag that there are forces at play that seek to reimagine the world in spheres of influence rather than as a global community. This is a situation that is evolving fast and one that is hard to predict.
For the countries of the Pacific islands region, this heralds an uncertainty in the near to medium term. Whilst the period since 2018 has seen increased geostrategic competition manifest in the region,[i] the next little while is likely to be even more volatile.
Data relating to the increasing use of defence diplomacy in the period 2018 to 2024 is captured in the Pacific Defence Diplomacy Tracker.[ii] This increased activity has exacerbated longstanding concerns about increasing levels of militarisation in the Pacific islands region. This includes an increased incidence of military-police engagements in countries that do not have standing military forces, such as Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. These engagements include training, provision of equipment and infrastructure, and joint exercises. Whilst much of this support is welcomed in the region, there are growing concerns about an increasingly militarised approach to policing. Images of police officers training in full riot gear or with high-powered weapons are at odds with policies and normative approaches based around community policing.[iii]
It is well recognised that across the Pacific islands region, countries adopt a ‘friends to all, enemies to none’ approach to foreign policy. Some countries are members of the Non-Aligned Movement and guard their neutrality carefully. However, it is inappropriate to cast these approaches as indicative of a failure to understand the implications of geopolitical shifts on the part of Pacific policy makers. Whilst it is certainly the case that geopolitics is not the first order of concern in Pacific governments, that does not mean that Pacific leaders and their advisers are not actively involved in analysing the changing strategic environment and what it means for their countries and their region.
For example, the Boe Declaration on Regional Security[iv] explicitly states:
We recognise an increasingly complex regional security environment driven by multifaceted security challenges, and a dynamic geopolitical environment leading to an increasingly crowded and complex region.
This is the second point of the Declaration, coming immediately after the regional reaffirmation of climate change as the biggest security threat that Pacific island countries face. The Boe Declaration has been incorporated into the regional security architecture and operationalised by way of an action plan.[v] More recently this has been augmented by the Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration which was endorsed by Pacific leaders at the 54th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting held in Honiara in 2025.[vi] How this latest Declaration will be accommodated within the regional security architecture is an ongoing matter of debate, including at the most recent edition of the Pacific Dialogue convened at the University of the South Pacific’s Laucala Campus in December 2025.[vii]
A key issue arising from these conversations is one that has been part of analyses of Pacific regionalism more generally for many years. It is how the Pacific Islands Forum can or should address breaches of the norms that are promulgated as the products of collective thinking and consensus-based negotiation. For example, the Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration states that Pacific signatories commit to:
supporting a rules-based international order, grounded in the Charter of the United Nations, harnessing international norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour, including measures and protocols to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and suppress all acts of aggression, (Article v)
However, elsewhere in the Declaration the parties commit to:
upholding the right of all states to conduct their domestic affairs, and to the principle of friendly relations. (Article ix).
So, even if there were any wish to create some sort of enforcement regime around the commitments in the Declaration, it is hard to see how that could be operationalised in any meaningful way. These are the strategic challenges with which scholars, practitioners and regional policy makers are currently grappling.[viii]
Australia is continuing to press its case as the number one security partner for countries in Melanesia and elsewhere in the region. Recent agreements between Australia and Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, and Nauru have seen commitments to migration pathways, support for a team in the Australian national rugby league competition and increased development assistance tied directly to security commitments. Whilst entering into these bilateral agreements does not constitute a repudiation of a ‘friends to all’ approach, it does imply that, as Anna Powles has argued, some friends are more important than others.[ix] In addition, Powles has identified that an aspect of this ‘networked’ security is the potential to create increased expectations on Pacific partners to these arrangements, including by way of explicit text in security agreements. This has already been canvassed in relation to the Pukpuk treaty between Papua New Guinea and Australia.[x]
Increasing the coverage of these arrangements is likely to be more challenging in the next few years. The ‘Nakamal Agreement’ between Vanuatu and Australia failed to materialise in September of 2025[xi] and is now apparently in limbo. This fraught process demonstrates that once the low-hanging fruit have gone, things get a lot trickier. Vanuatu’s ‘ask’ was that its citizens be allowed visa free access to Australia. This was always going to be beyond what Canberra could give in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. Whilst the Nakamal Agreement envisages a parallel pathway to improve access to Australia for ni-Vanuatu people, there are still some significant blockages to getting the Nakamal Agreement across the line. It is not certain that it will be signed in 2026 or at all. If it is finalised and accepted by both governments, it will likely be with little fanfare given the protracted process.
The problems associated with the Nakamal Agreement send an important message not just to Canberra but to other partners who are seeking to enter into agreements of this type with Pacific island countries. They can prove a test of how much diplomatic and political commitment is available to achieve a strategic objective. For Australian political leaders, there will be caution about high-level invitations to Port Vila that risk producing little in the way of tangible outcomes. There are important developments at the national level which reflect and are driven by an increased focus on the geopolitical environment in which Pacific countries’ policymakers are operating. Some of these are driven by regional imperatives. For example, the Boe Declaration mandates that all PIF members should develop a national security strategy. In addition, several countries, including Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu, have recently released documents that set out their foreign policy and security positions.
The question of sovereignty is inextricably linked to strategic actions of this sort. In the Pacific islands region, it can be a vexed topic for several reasons. First, the countries of the region are very young, having emerged from the colonial era in the 1960s onwards.[xii] Unsurprisingly, national sovereignty is highly valued and a reluctance to cede it has hampered attempts to pool service delivery on many occasions.[xiii] Secondly, capacity constraints and a high level of dependence on aid from richer countries has meant that some of these sensitive elements of statecraft have actually been undertaken by so-called experts from donor countries. Given the heightened state of geo-strategic anxiety currently at play, it is no surprise that this creates concern about national priorities being unduly influenced by outsiders.[xiv] It is to be expected and largely hoped that Pacific island countries will continue to adopt an assertive approach to engagement with outside powers. The nature of these engagements must be based on a commitment to inclusive and sustainable social good in accordance with accepted societal values and commitments to global norms.
Decline of multilateralism
Historically, Pacific island countries have embraced opportunities to be part of multilateral organisations and processes, even though the costs of participation may be high. This participation is seen to be of benefit to the countries of the region for three reasons.
First, multilateral forums create spaces in which the voices of small island states can be amplified beyond the limits imposed by bilateral power imbalances. We have seen Pacific island countries make use of this facility by working collectively through the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS). Some of the most significant developments in the Conference of the Parties (COP) process of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have eventuated from collective diplomacy on the part of Pacific island countries and their negotiators.[xv]
Secondly, multilateralism facilitates coordination when it comes to solving regional and global problems. This can be in the realms of climate action, disaster response, trade rules and public health. This is important for countries with limited resources and whose economic power constrains their ability to negotiate favourable terms.
Thirdly, a multilateral system provides a degree of institutional stability and predictability for aid flows and technical cooperation. This can extend to providing the backbone of critical service delivery, such as childhood vaccination programmes. This is particularly important in countries such as Papua New Guinea where national and provincial governments struggle to deliver services to remote and isolated populations.[xvi]
A decline in commitment to multilateralism such as we are experiencing now therefore has an impact on Pacific island countries. Of course, it influences all countries who are or seek to be part of multilateral organisations. However, the question is whether the effects on Pacific island countries are distinct in either their nature or the quantum of their impact.
Currently, the most explicit retreat from multilateralism is that exhibited by the Trump administration. Aside from this, research shows that while participation in the global multilateral system remains high, its performance is declining in key areas such as climate action, peace and security, and human rights.[xvii]
One aspect of this reduced performance that is relevant for the countries of the Pacific islands region is the shift away from providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding through multilateral mechanisms in favour of bilateral arrangements among members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1
The growing preference for bilateral rather than multilateral mechanisms is directly linked to the geostrategic competition discussed previously. This shift has mixed impacts on countries in the Pacific islands region. Bilateral engagements are often viewed as more significant, with higher visibility and a greater sense of control than may be the case when dealing with multilateral mechanisms. However, as the number of bilateral engagements increases, so do the transactional costs associated with negotiation and implementation. This can put increased strain on small bureaucracies.
Pacific island leaders and climate negotiators are becoming increasingly disillusioned and dissatisfied with the UNFCCC processes including what is or is not achieved at successive COP meetings.[xviii] Australia’s ceding hosting rights for COP31 to Türkiye came as an additional blow in Belem late last year. Whilst a pre-COP meeting of global leaders to be held in the Pacific has been secured,[xix] it is hard to see how effective this will be. The date and location of this event have not yet been announced, which adds to the sense that it will not attract sufficient world leaders to have the impact that the region wants or needs.
Given the centrality of the climate crisis to the strategic environment of the region, it is not surprising to see that Pacific leaders, activists and negotiators are seeking innovative ways to prosecute their agendas for climate action and justice. They are continuing to capitalise on their ability to caucus within regional and international multilateral forums and increasingly looking to leverage their moral authority for strategic gain.
The recent landmark Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice[xx] is one such example and we can expect to see the effects of this become more apparent in the next few years as it is relied on in legal arguments in national and international courts. At COP 30, Pacific countries launched their plan to become the world’s first region to rely on 100% renewable energy, in an initiative spearheaded by President Surangel Whipps Jr of Palau.[xxi] This plan was welcomed by Leaders at the 54th annual meeting held in Solomon Islands during September 2025. This builds on previous work, demonstrating the need for a strategic and consistent approach. The 5th Meeting of Pacific Regional Energy and Transport Ministers recommended the appointment of a Pacific Energy Commissioner for a Just and Equitable Transition to a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific.[xxii] This comes further to the signing of the Port Vila Call for a Just Transition to a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific in 2023.[xxiii]
In addition, Pacific island countries are at the forefront of the call for a global fossil fuels non-proliferation treaty. The disappointment associated with the outcomes of COP30 catalysed a new treaty initiative which is intended to operate outside the COP mechanism. Pacific island countries can be expected to play a leading role in this, with Tuvalu and Vanuatu slated to co-host the Second International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels.[xxiv]
Alongside the decline in multilateralism, we have seen an increase in minilateralism. This manifests in terms of both a growing number of minilateral arrangements and an enhanced focus on their significance in terms of diplomatic and political energy. These are spaces which are unlikely to be widely available to Pacific island countries. Given its size and strategic importance, Papua New Guinea will be a valuable partner in certain circumstances. An example is the Australia-PNG-Indonesia Trilateral Defence Ministers Meeting which had its inaugural meeting in Port Moresby in December 2025.[xxv] Fiji could also possibly be a contender. Beyond that, it is very unlikely that other Pacific island countries will be invited to these conversations.
And yet, they are conversations in which Pacific voices deserve to be heard. Not only that, but it would also be strategically inept to regress to the overt paternalism of the past in which great powers talked about Pacific island countries, rather than talking with them. But before talking there is a crucial preliminary step. Last year, Mihai Sora of the Lowy Institute asked “After listening, what’s Australia’s next move in the Pacific?”[xxvi] The answer is ‘more and better listening’. Listening is a process and not a product. For Australian officials and others there is much more to learn and practise about listening – listening to a wider, more diverse selection of voices, listening to hear, and listening to those whose positions are challenging or problematic.
Powers such as Canada[xxvii] and Germany[xxviii] who are seeking to grow their presence in the region may convince themselves that a quick and efficient way to understand the region is to access and accept analysis put forward by the foreign affairs and national security agencies of Australia and/or New Zealand. To do so is a strategic misstep. It is a long time since the leaders and strategic thinkers of the Pacific islands region were comfortable in having their concerns conveyed accurately or sympathetically by officials in Canberra and Wellington.
Conclusion and recommendations
Too often it is claimed that there is no strategic community in the Pacific islands region and that credible interlocutors on matters of foreign policy and security are too hard to find.[xxix] This is a total misrepresentation of the reality and a denial of the depth and sophistication of conversations that take place at national and regional levels.
However, it remains the case that there are too few spaces that are Pacific-led in which strategic debate can be conducted. An exception to this is the Pacific Dialogue, a track 2 dialogue event which is hosted by the University of the South Pacific and which will convene for the fourth time in 2026. Previously, Anna Powles and Joanne Wallis have argued the importance of using track 1.5 dialogues in the Pacific islands region.[xxx] Investment in these activities is a pathway to growing and deepening strategic confidence among Pacific officials, scholars and civil society actors.
RECOMMENDATION 1
Pacific island governments, regional organisations, and diplomatic partners need to make meaningful investment in developing a culture of critical engagement with strategic issues as they affect the Pacific by way of track 2 and track 1.5 dialogue events at both national and regional levels.
The strategic challenges faced by Pacific policy makers in 2026 are not new ones. However, the current period presents a crucial inflection point which requires a more robust response than may have been acceptable in the past.
RECOMMENDATION 2
Pacific island governments and societies must ensure that strategic spaces are constructed and maintained with appropriate levels of sovereignty and autonomy in place. Partners must act proactively to structure their contributions to ensure that strategic conversations are Pacific-led.
Resource and capacity constraints can make it hard for Pacific island countries to assert and maintain sufficient strategic autonomy. This has led to sensitive strategic documents such as foreign policy papers or national security policies being written by foreigners. At other levels we see initiatives such as new programmes of security studies being funded by development partners.[xxxi] This approach can undermine sovereignty, and being too keen to enter into agreements with partners can have significant impacts at the domestic political level.[xxxii]
RECOMMENDATION 3
Pacific island governments must work with development partners to provide increased opportunity for education and training in key strategic domains (international relations, security, trade, diplomacy) to develop sovereign capacity across government, academia and civil society. This includes directing scholarship opportunities to relevant disciplines, particularly for postgraduate study.
For Pacific officials, scholars, activists and others to be able to engage confidently and productively in engagements such as those outlined above, there need to be appropriate opportunities for education and professional development in fields such as international relations, security studies, and diplomacy. These areas of study are largely absent from the subjects associated with scholarship opportunities, whether provided by national governments or development partners.
About the author
Dr Tess Newton Cain is a distinguished academic and consultant with more than 25 years’ experience in Pacific governance, development and regional security. She is Principal Consultant at Sustineo and an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, where she formerly led the Pacific Hub.
With a PhD in Law and Criminology and experience as a Lecturer in Law at the University of the South Pacific, Tess brings deep expertise in the legal, political and social dynamics shaping Pacific Island states. A dual citizen of Vanuatu and the United Kingdom, she has longstanding regional connections and extensive experience working with governments, regional organisations and development partners. Her advisory work includes collaborations with the United Nations, World Bank, International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Tess is also a trusted media commentator, regularly providing analysis on Pacific politics and geopolitics to Australian and international outlets, including ABC, SBS, BBC, Reuters and The Guardian.
Notes and references
[i] Anna Powles and Tess Newton Cain (2024) “Why the Pacific Islands Is Seeing a Rise in ‘Defence Diplomacy’” in Defsec NZ Pacific https://defsec.net.nz/2024/05/31/defence-diplomacy-in-pacific-island-countries/
[ii] Tess Newton Cain, Anna Powles & Teddy Winn (2024), Pacific Defence Diplomacy Tracker 2018-2024, supported by the United States Institute of Peace, published by Griffith Asia Institute https://www.griffith.edu.au/research/business/asia-institute/pacific-hub/defence-diplomacy-in-the-pacific#database
[iii] Nic Maclellan (2024) “It’s not just police who police” in Islands Business https://islandsbusiness.com/features/its-not-just-police-who-police/
[iv] Pacific Islands Forum (2018) Boe Declaration on Regional Security https://forumsec.org/publications/boe-declaration-regional-security
[v] Pacific Islands Forum (2019) Boe Declaration Action Plan https://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/BOE-document-Action-Plan.pdf
[vi] Pacific Islands Forum (2025) Forum Communiqué https://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/54th%20Pacific%20Islands%20Forum%20Leaders%20Communique_final.pdf
[vii] The outcomes paper is forthcoming
[viii] Sione Tekiteki and Joel Nilon (2025) “A Blue Pacific rules-based order: ‘Our Home, our Rules’” in Devpolicy https://devpolicy.org/a-blue-pacific-rules-based-order-our-home-our-rules-20250314/
[ix] Anna Powles (2025) “Friends to all, bound to some: Pacific Island states, security agreements, and the regional order” in Pacific Dynamics 9/3 https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/items/ecb43908-69cd-4f06-99b2-856e53887ecf
[x] Patrick Bell (2025) “Papua New Guinea may sit out potential conflict between Australia and China despite Pukpuk defence treaty” ABC Online https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-10-06/png-may-sit-out-australia-china-conflict-despite-defence-pct/105859432
[xi] Stephen Dziedzic and Lillyrose Welwel (2025) “Australia-Vanuatu Nakamal agreement remains unsigned, as Albanese stops in Port Vila ahead of Pacific Islands Forum” ABC online https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-09-09/albanase-vanuatu-australia-nakamal-agreement/105750522
[xii] Papua New Guinea celebrated 50 years of independence from Australia in 2025.
[xiii] Matthew Dornan and Tess Newton Cain (2014) “Regional Service Delivery among Pacific Island Countries: An Assessment” in Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 1/3: 541-560 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.45
[xiv] Hilaire Bule (2025) “PM sets record straight on foreign adviser access” in Vanuatu Daily Post https://www.dailypost.vu/news/pm-sets-record-straight-on-foreign-adviser-access/article_127e17e9-558c-5fc0-8c53-b59e2a12a35c.html
[xv] Wesley Morgan, Sala George Carter & Fulori Manoa (2024) “Leading from the Frontline: A History of Pacific Climate Diplomacy” in The Journal of Pacific History 59/3: 353-374. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223344.2024.2360093
[xvi] World Health Organisation (2025) “No Child Left Behind: PNG’s Fight Against Polio” https://www.who.int/papuanewguinea/news/detail/23-10-2025-no-child-left-behind–png-s-fight-against-polio
[xvii] International Peace Institute and Institute for Economics and Peace (2024) Multilateralism Index 2024 https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Multilateralism-index-web-111024.pdf
[xviii] Christine Rovoi (2025) “COP 30 leaves Pacific nations facing a future they cannot survive” for PMN News https://pmn.co.nz/read/environment/cop30-leaves-pacific-nations-facing-a-future-they-cannot-survive
[xix] Michelle Grattan (2025) “Australia cedes COP31 but negotiates role for Chris Bowen and Pacific countries” in The Conversation https://theconversation.com/australia-cedes-cop31-but-negotiates-role-for-chris-bowen-and-pacific-countries-270274
[xx]Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion) [2025] ICJ, General List No. 187, 23 July https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20250723-adv-01-00-en.pdf
[xxi] Caleb Fotheringham (2025) “Pacific leaders to push 100% renewable energy plan at COP30 in Belem” for Radio New Zealand https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/578153/pacific-leaders-to-push-100-percent-renewable-energy-plan-at-cop30-in-belem
[xxii] Elenoa Dimaira (2023) “Call for Pacific Energy Commissioner” in Islands Business https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/call-for-pacific-energy-commissioner/#:~:text=May%2016%2C%202023%20_%20Elenoa%20Dimaira,at%20the%20PIF%20Leaders%20Meeting.
[xxiii] Makereta Komai (2023) “Pacific ministers call for fossil fuel free Pacific” in Islands Business https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/fossil-fuel-free-pacific-1/
[xxiv] María de los Ángeles Orfila (2026) “COP30 ended without a clear fossil fuel roadmap but new initiatives emerged” in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists https://thebulletin.org/2026/01/cop30-ended-without-a-clear-fossil-fuel-roadmap-but-new-initiatives-emerged/
[xxv] Marian Faa and Stephen Dziedzic (2025) “Papua New Guinea calls for ‘buffer zone’ with Indonesia amid concerns over West Papua conflict” ABC Online https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-02/png-calls-for-buffer-zone-with-indonesia-amid-australia-treaty/106090380
[xxvi] Mihai Sora (2025) “After listening, what’s Australia’s next move in the Pacific?” in The Interpreter https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/after-listening-what-s-australia-s-next-move-pacific
[xxvii] Viliame Tawanakoro (2025) “Canada boost support and development in the Pacific” in Islands Business https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/canada-boosts-support-and-development-in-the-pacific/
[xxviii] Deutschland.de (2026) “Germany recognises Niue in the South Pacific” https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/politics/niue-south-pacific-recognition
[xxix] E.g. ‘Ep. 30: Australia’s High Commissioners to Solomon Islands and Samoa discuss diplomacy in the Pacific” on Australia and the World October 2nd, 2019, https://australiaintheworld.podbean.com/e/ep-30-australia-s-high-commissioners-to-solomon-islands-and-samoa-discuss-diplomacy-in-the-pacific/
[xxx] Anna Powles and Joanne Wallis (2022) “It’s time to talk to, not at, the Pacific” in The Strategist https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/its-time-to-talk-to-not-at-the-pacific/
[xxxi] In 2025 the Solomon Islands National University offered a Postgraduate certificate in security studies in partnership with, and funded by, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia
[xxxii] Prianka Srinivasan (2023) “Vanuatu PM faces no-confidence vote as rivals cite ‘foreign engagement’ concerns” in The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/08/vanuatu-pm-faces-no-confidence-vote-as-rivals-cite-foreign-engagement-concerns
