The Group of Twenty’s (G20) networked global governance could become one of its most enduring influences on the twenty-first century. The forum’s inclusion of more developing-state representatives and non-state actors in global governance networks and processes, contributing to recent international authority shifts, is key to assessing contestation about its legitimacy and efficiency.
G20 ‘hub’ for policy diffusion and decentralising authority
The G20 continues to be influential, despite growing skepticism about its policymaking and leadership capacities. It has become, at best, an imperfect multilateral steering committee, some would argue more of a focal point; however, it remains a crucial hub for policy diffusion and decentralising authority in global economic governance. I stressed these points in my discussion of networked G20 governance at the Griffith Asia Institute’s 9th annual Australia-Japan Dialogue, which focused on the theme The G20: Outcomes, Issues and Prospects.
New G20 inclusivity practices augmented the global-governance status of leading developing states and increased the influence of civil society stakeholders, which should not be forgotten amid growing skepticism about the forum. Examples of these normative and practical shifts included the integration of G20 developing-state members in global financial governance bodies, such as the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board since 2009; and the creation of its currently-eight official engagement forums for non-state actors. These G20 effects were beneficial, even though there are legitimate criticisms of its lack of progress on economic growth and phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, and on the need to accelerate G20 efforts to achieve the United Nations’ 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.
The Japanese G20 presidency arguably was a partial success. There was sufficient consensus to produce the Osaka Summit leaders’ declaration. This contrasted favorably with the Group of Seven’s (G7) failure to publish a comprehensive document, with just a brief communiqué released from its Biarritz Summit, perhaps indicative that the G20 currently is in better shape than the G7. There were agreements on a range of policy issues in Osaka, covering the usual G20 agenda topics, including infrastructure, sustainable development, financial regulation, and tax and transparency; as well as issues brought to the agenda by the Japanese G20 presidency, such as the challenges of aging populations and marine plastic waste.
There was also a continuance of the political dissensus on trade and climate issues that marked the 2018 Buenos Aires G20 Summit, especially between the Trump Administration and several other G20 members. This was evident from disagreements between the Trump and Macron delegations in Osaka, which undermined prospects for a leaders’ communiqué at the subsequent G7 summit.
The G20’s broad agenda is indicative of how the range of issues has expanded, especially since the Korean G20 presidency added economic development to the agenda in 2010, with its ‘Seoul Development Consensus.’ This was influenced by epistemic and normative shifts constituted through a global development governance network, similar to the global financial governance network that influenced the G20’s endorsement of macroprudential financial regulation during the global financial crisis. Despite the common perception that G20 cooperation declined after the crisis, the forum subsequently expanded its areas of cooperation, especially through transversal approaches to sustainable development and other important policy issues.
How global governance networks influence the G20
Global governance networks have influenced the G20’s post-crisis policy contestation and broader international practices. One example is the gender-equality global governance network, which influenced the Australian G20 presidency’s decision to incorporate the goal of reducing the gender labour-participation gap, by 25 percent by the year 2025, in its Brisbane Summit leaders’ declaration. The Australian G20 presidency was influenced by civil society gender-equality advocates, as well as officials from multilateral organisations, whose combined efforts contributed to achieving the inclusion of this target.
The recent Osaka G20 Summit declaration similarly indicated the influence of the gender-equality global governance network, by incorporating core commitments advocated by five of the official engagement groups, namely the Civil 20, Labour 20, Think 20 (T20), Women 20, and Youth 20, on the labor-participation gap and on eliminating violence and harassment against women.
G20 engagement forums augmented the heterogeneity of global governance networks, contributing to their growing diversity and cooperation through linked professional ‘ecologies’. The latter indicates linkages between networks of professionals working in distinct fields or contexts, yet cooperating on particular issues. The potential for these governance networks to influence G20 policymaking is evident from the T20’s engagement, especially as many of the think-tanks and research institutes involved provide policy analysis to governments.
Policy convergence between G20-engaged think-tanks, through their T20 collaboration, could significantly influence multilateral cooperation. Scholarly literature already noted this shifting context of international cooperation in the 1990s, when James Rosenau and others began to emphasise the broader complexity of global governance actors and relations, rather than the more issue-specific and intergovernmentally-focused notion of international regimes. Many governments’ increasing emphasis on public diplomacy is indicative of this stress on broader societal engagement, through new diplomatic ‘outreach’ practices.
Decentralising authority and G20 agenda expansion
The G20 was crucial for decentralising authority away from leading wealthy states since the global financial crisis, especially in global economic governance. This has often occurred through contingencies, processes, and practices beyond the control of individual actors, or even states. This is indicated by the debate among experts and officials on whether the G20 agenda should be narrowed, for perceived efficiency purposes; or whether its broad agenda should continue due to perceived legitimacy gains.
The agenda has substantially expanded since the Korean G20 presidency initiated this broadening process, partly due to the ‘Christmas-tree effect’ of each G20 Chair opting to adorn the agenda with new topics. This builds further momentum for agenda expansion, even if some policymakers and experts advocate refocusing on macroeconomic and financial policy issues. The Australian G20 presidency of 2014 was a good example, as it advocated the narrow-agenda approach while incorporating new agenda items, especially the gender labour-participation gap and a greater focus on infrastructure. It is still possible that future contingencies, particularly another serious financial crisis, might again lead to a narrower, crisis-driven agenda.
One consequence of this agenda expansion is that it implicitly contributes to decentralising global governance authority and augmenting the heterogeneity of G20 governance networks. This is because the broader contexts of policy engagement engage more actors and actor-networks, while constituting new G20-influenced policymaking processes. Importantly, the broader-agenda approach also incorporates more of the priorities of the G20’s developing-state members, further indicating a process of decentralising global governance authority.
Networked G20 governance
The G20’s political and diplomatic constraints have often been exposed by dissensus on macroeconomic policies, also on climate and trade issues since Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory. This does not diminish the significance of the G20’s influence on global governance, especially by constituting inclusivity practices that augmented the status and role of developing-state representatives and non-state actors, while increasing the forum’s perceived legitimacy and, potentially, its efficiency. G20 influence on increasingly heterogeneous global governance networks arguably decreases negative effects from the type of groupthink that led to the global financial crisis. The latter occurred due to the collective failure of pre-crisis, G7-led global governance networks to prevent it, partly because the appropriate lessons from the earlier Asian financial crisis were not learnt.
Networked G20 governance influences political and normative contestation on global economic governance, across the forum’s expansive and transversally-linked policy agenda. This significantly contributed to decentralising global governance authority and processes since 2008. The G20 will likely remain more important for global economic governance than the G7, due to post-2008 political and normative shifts to embedding legitimacy—and inclusivity—practices. These processes of adjustment were reinforced by strategic authority shifts, as leading developing states became more significant for the world economy. The G20’s contemporary importance, plus its significance as a future crisis committee-in-waiting, are consequences of its role in decentralising global authority and networked governance processes.
Jonathan Luckhurst is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of Internal Peace Studies of Soka University in Tokyo. This commentary is informed by discussions at the Griffith Asia Institute 9th Annual Australia-Japan Dialogue, themed The G20: Outcomes, Issues and Prospects, held in Brisbane 29 November 2019.
