Half right, all wrong: Rethinking how we view China
ANDREW SCOBELL AND KAI HE |
The limits of a capabilities-first view
Debates about China in Washington are often framed as a tug-of-war between alarm and reassurance. Some argue the United States underestimates the China challenge; others claim it is overstated, pointing to economic headwinds or “peak China.” A third group calls for a more measured approach. Yet despite their differences, these perspectives share a common flaw: they focus heavily on what China can do, while paying far less attention to what it intends to do.
This imbalance matters. A strategy built primarily on capabilities—military strength, economic weight, or technological advancement—risks misreading Beijing’s behaviour. Capabilities alone do not reveal intent, and assuming they do can lead to worst-case thinking, policy overreach, and self-fulfilling prophecies.
A more effective approach requires combining capability assessments with a clear-eyed understanding of intent—asking not just how powerful China is, but what its leaders believe, fear, and prioritise.
A defensive mindset behind a rising power
China’s strategic outlook is far more inwardly focused than many assume. While Beijing has regional and global ambitions, these are often extensions of domestic priorities rather than a blueprint for global domination. The leadership’s foremost concern is stability at home—preserving Communist Party rule, sustaining economic growth, and maintaining national unity.
This helps explain why Beijing frames many of its actions as defensive. Chinese leaders view the United States as the primary threat to these core interests. From their perspective, American alliances, technological restrictions, and trade measures form part of a broader effort to contain China’s rise and weaken its political system. Whether accurate or not, this perception shapes Beijing’s responses.
The result is a paradox: a powerful state that sees itself as vulnerable. China’s behaviour is not driven by a master plan for expansion, but by a reactive security logic rooted in perceived threat.
Taiwan and trade: where misreading intent matters
Misunderstanding this dynamic often leads to overinterpreting Chinese capabilities as evidence of aggressive intent. Nowhere is this clearer than in debates over Taiwan. China’s military build-up and increased activity around the island are frequently cited as proof of imminent invasion. While possible, this is not necessarily the most likely outcome.
Beijing’s preferred approach has long been “peaceful reunification”—a strategy combining economic incentives, political pressure, and coercion below the threshold of war. This “grey zone” approach aims to shift the balance gradually without triggering full-scale conflict. Military force remains an option, but a risky and less desirable one.
If policymakers focus only on China’s capabilities, they may overestimate the likelihood of war and adopt policies that heighten tensions. Stronger deterrence, for instance, can reinforce Beijing’s perception of hostile intent, fuelling the very dynamics it seeks to prevent.
A similar misreading appears in trade policy. When the United States imposed steep tariffs, it assumed economic pressure would force Beijing to concede. Instead, China retaliated, absorbing high costs rather than appearing weak. This response reflects concerns about regime legitimacy and national pride—factors often overlooked in capabilities-based analysis.
Getting China right
In both cases, misreading intent leads to policy missteps. Underestimating China’s resolve in trade and overestimating its willingness to use force over Taiwan stem from the same issue: seeing China only in terms of capability, not motivation.
Getting China right requires a more balanced framework that integrates both. This means engaging seriously with Chinese sources while recognising their limits, and developing a deeper understanding of how China’s leaders view their history, identity, and strategic environment.
It also calls for a more calibrated policy. An effective strategy is neither appeasement nor provocation, but alignment with the other side’s priorities. In trade, this could mean targeted measures paired with incentives. In security, it requires combining deterrence with reassurance to reduce miscalculation.
Finally, sustained engagement remains essential. High-level dialogue, military communication, and people-to-people exchanges help manage competition and reduce misunderstanding, even if they cannot eliminate rivalry.
The danger of getting China “half right” is not just analytical—it is strategic. Overemphasising capabilities while ignoring intent encourages both sides to assume the worst, turning suspicion into confrontation. In an era of deep interdependence, such miscalculations carry serious risks.
A more nuanced understanding will not guarantee stability, but it improves the odds. Looking beyond raw power to the motivations behind it offers a better chance of deterring conflict without making it more likely.
Professor Andrew Scobell is an adjunct professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Kai He is a professor of international relations at the School of Government and International Relations and a member of the Griffith Asia Institute.
This article is a synopsis of the journal article, Scobell, A., & He, K. (2026). Why Getting China Half Right Risks Getting It All Wrong. The Washington Quarterly, 49(1), 89–107.