The rise of China is one of the most dynamic political phenomena in world politics in the 21st century. As David Shambaugh, a prominent China scholar points out, “the rise of China is the big story of our era”. Due to the mutual deterrence effects of nuclear weapons, large-scale military conflicts might be avoided between China and the United States. However, because of diverse strategic interests and different ideologies, diplomatic and military crises still seem unavoidable in future U.S.-China relations. If the two countries cannot manage foreign policy crises effectively and peacefully, escalating conflicts—even war—may occur unexpectedly between the two nations.

Besides the United States, China has also involved into some notable interstate crises with other countries, such as with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and with the Philippines in the South China Sea. In addition, the “oil rig” crisis between China and Vietnam and the “P-8 incident” between China and the United States over the South China Sea in 2014 also deepened the strategic suspicions regarding the implications of China’s rise for regional security. In May 2015, another “P8-A incident” between China and the United States happened in the South China Sea. In late 2015, the US Navy started to challenge China’s “excessive claims” in the South China Sea through the “freedom of navigation” operations. Although it is still too early to predict the “the-ripe-for-rivalry” scenario in Asia, it is reasonable to believe that China will get more involved in-foreign policy crises, intentionally or not, with the United States— the existing hegemon in the region—and with its neighbors such as Japan and the Philippines.

China has continued to increase their military and economic power, and as such, it is imperative for policy makers in the world to understand the dynamics of China’s behavior in foreign policy crises so the rise of China can be managed in a peaceful manner. In the past three decades China’s behavioral patterns in crises have varied from case to case. In some instances, China escalated crises while in others China retreated or deescalated crises. This variation in China’s crisis behavior needs to be systematically studied by scholars and policy analysts. The major purpose of this book is to explore patterns of China’s foreign policy crisis behavior after the Cold War, i.e., when and under what conditions Chinese leaders take risks to escalate a foreign policy crisis and when Chinese leaders avoid risks and deescalate a crisis. The findings will help scholars and policymakers better understand and predict China’s crisis behavior in the future.

In this book, China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy (Cambridge 2016), I introduce a political survival-prospect model to explain the variation in China’s behavior across different crises. I argue that China’s crisis behavior is a function of Chinese top leaders’ calculations or prospects regarding their “political survival” status, which is shaped by three factors: the severity of the crisis, leaders’ domestic authority, and international pressure. When Chinese leaders enjoy the prospect of a surplus of political survival during a foreign policy crisis, they are more likely to de-escalate the crisis, i.e., to choose a risk-averse decision to avoid more trouble. If they face the prospect of a deficit of political survival, they are more likely to escalate the crisis, i.e., to take a risk-acceptant policy with the hope of reversing the disadvantageous situation.

In order to test the political survival-prospect model in explaining the behavioral pattern of China’s policy during crises, I conduct qualitative case studies through examining eight foreign policy crises under the Chinese leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao with the United States and other nations during the post-Cold War period. The cases include the 1993 Yinhe ship inspection incident, the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 embassy bombing incident, the 2001 EP-3 midair collision, the 2009 Impeccable incident, the 2010 boat collision between China and Japan near the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the 2012 Scarborough shoal crisis between China and the Philippines, and the 2012 “islands purchase” crisis between China and Japan.

This book aims to provide valuable knowledge and information to the policymaking community in the Asia Pacific Region in order to prevent a potential conflict with China. China is a rising power, and the United States is still the most powerful hegemon in the world. China’s rise and its relationship with other nations will shape prosperity and security in the region. The key to successfully preventing conflicts with China is to understand China’s possible behavior during crises, i.e., under what conditions China may escalate a foreign policy crisis and under what conditions China may not. How to manage the relations between the United States and China and between China and its neighbors, especially during a crisis situation, is one of the most difficult tasks for policy makers in the region in the 21st century.

Article by Griffith Asia Institute Associate Professor Kai He.